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in In 1976, the Latvian artist Valdis Celms set to work on models for 
the Pozitron, a crystal-disco-ball-like structure imagined as the 
origin of a sprawling mass of light. Rotating around a central ball, the 
Pozitron’s metallic prisms would refract and reflect both internal and 
external light sources, bathing the Ukrainian factory for which the 
structure was designed in various shades of soothing glow. Celms 
developed four distinct regimes of illumination for the Pozitron, each 
in turn shifting with contingencies of natural light, in a bid to draw 
sensory lines between weekdays, Sundays, international festivals 
and state festivals. Detailed plans and drafts were drawn at the 
factory’s request, but years rolled by and the thing was never built. 
In 2019, it was announced that the 2nd Riga International Biennial of 
Contemporary Art (RIBOCA2), due to take place from May 2020, 
would see Celms’s neglected project realised at last. By April 2020, 
with the art world on lockdown in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
it was clear that this could not proceed as  planned. 
What would it mean for a ’70s invention, conceived in relation to 
a Soviet industrial order of which there remain only traces, to be 
‘realised’ as part of a twenty-first-century art show? Which part of 
Celms’s vision, against the shell-like backdrop of contemporary 
(neo)liberalised Riga, was considered by the artist and organisers 
compatible with being fulfilled? In modern day Andrejsala, the idea 
of hypothetically enhancing the sensory experience of factory 
workers by playing on the rhythms of the social calendar might jar, 
for instance, with the general liberal consensus that holidays aren’t 
for work. Presented as a ‘model’, Pozitron gestures towards an ideal, 
but in 2020 would do so by means of a mechanism only tangentially 
compatible with what that ideal entails. What’s more, even in 1976, 
the work’s ‘model’ status was itself less an earnest statement of 
intent than a canny means of exhibiting art on otherwise hostile 
ground. Working in a Cold War dictatorship that rejected the values 
of artistic abstraction, Celms’s designation of the ‘design’ category 
to this piece, rather than signalling an expectation of meticulous 
fulfilment, represented a means of pushing what is now described 
as an artwork into the space of then-acceptable use- and industry-
based endeavour. 
According to its own internal logic, the Pozitron’s meaning and value 
is arguably produced without recourse to its purported intention. 
The aesthetic operations of this kind of kinetic art were, according 
to Celms himself, to do with the possibilities inherent in a spatial 
structure.1 In fact, they might be read as concerned above all with 
ideas of possibility itself. The kinetic process begins with a static 
form, the motion of which begins to reveal the potential in that form. 
Such potential, says Celms, is inherent in the structure itself, the role 
of motion being one of interpretation. According to this principle, the 
effect of motion on the structure’s shifting manifestation unfurls (in 
the Pozitron’s case through the play of light) a sense of possibility that 
floods both body and brain. It is such an aesthetic experience, both 
meditative and emotive, that constitutes the substance of this work – 
perfected, it would seem, in the function of the ‘model’ alone. Insofar 
as the experience of potential is evinced here through witnessing the 
relationship of motion to structure, a three-dimensional model, or 
even (in terms of concept) a two-dimensional plan, does much of the 
aesthetic and conceptual work – work that transcends, in the end, 
the actualised lighting of a factory floor. 
According to the principles of Celms’s kinetic process, potential 
might be best understood as a matter of delicate tension. Stasis, 
Celms explains, ‘is not alien to the kinetic object; on the contrary, 










inThere in that careful phrasing lies the key to an idea that grounds 
the project in philosophies of power. This ‘stasis-as-non-motion’ – 
non-motion as an affirmative state – seems to elevate the Pozitron’s 
powers of exposition towards a proposal that Giorgio Agamben 
credits with explaining and revealing potential in its truest and most 
realised form. For Agamben, the power and potential to be or to 
do involves, indeed requires, the power and potential not to be or 
do.3 Thus the Pozitron’s potentiality for movement consists in its 
potentiality not-to-move – its potential, that is, for stasis. Were this 
potentiality for stasis absent – were the model unable to be still – the 
Pozitron’s potentiality for movement would not be a potentiality at 
all and merely a matter of the ‘actual’. Inasmuch as the model, first 
in its stasis and then in its moving form, animates these principles of 
potential, it draws some attention to its own conditions of existence. 
In 1970s Riga under Soviet dictatorship, the conditions in which an 
artist grappling with abstract ideas of ‘the possible’ was able to 
articulate this project were severely limited. And while the Pozitron 
model appears at a surface level to suggest a horizon – a set of 
provisional ideals that could then go on to be fulfilled – in fact what it 
speaks to most of all are the limits of possibility in generalised states 
of duress. On these terms, if the Pozitron’s potential is ‘unrealised’, 
that is not because a giant rotating orb never made it through factory 
doors, but rather because the artist, in actualising his models, had no 
choice but to position them in terms of ‘construction’, ‘experiment’ 
and ‘design’. Agamben would require that artistic mastery retain 
a trace of resistance in its perfect form. The potentiality attached 
to the Pozitron’s being is lacking in any resistance to the potential 
(which it lacked) to have taken a different shape. 
In attempting to think in terms of pure potentiality, Agamben draws 
on Aristotle’s distinction in his Metaphysics between what on the 
one hand might be called a ‘capacity’ (dunamis), a theoretical kind 
of possibility, and what on the other is actually able to be realised 
(energeia). Aristotle makes this distinction to affirm that capacities or 
potentialities exist and persist, even when they cannot or will not be 
enacted. Perhaps the Pozitron’s greatest utopian force resides in its 
affirmation of just these kinds of potentialities. In its elegant display 
of movement-as-resistance-to-stagnation, the Pozitron subtly points 
to that which was missing from Soviet-sanctioned art at the time of 
its own creation: the degree of relative freedom required to enact 
an ideal. Aristotle’s realm of the dunamis, the field beyond the actual 
to which the Pozitron points, approximates to the kind of realm that 
Gilles Deleuze called the ‘virtual’. Just as Agamben sees in potentiality 
an active presence of absences, Deleuze saw in the ‘virtual’ a set 
of absences that, rather than awaiting realisation, were themselves 
completely real.4 For Deleuze there was more in the vast idea of 
the ‘virtual’ than there ever could be in the simple domain of the 
‘actual’. More, perhaps, in ‘virtual’ states of art than their realisation 
in biennials. 
But what if the virtual biennial were to become the norm? Does 
the virtual in its garden sense, which points, in effect, ‘online’, have 
any important relationship to the ‘virtual’ meant by Deleuze?5 Such 
a relationship could not be one of equivalence, given that the 
Deleuzian ‘virtuality’ is concerned with process rather than any fixed 
state. But might the process of art’s virtualisation, contrary to much 
common sense, open up a space for encounter with something 
materially greater than that which can be physically made? From a 
constructivist point of view (Russian Constructivism forming, indeed, 
an important part of Celms’s conceptual heritage, along with that 
of others included in RIBOCA2) a work’s materiality could certainly 





























– than to its physical actualisation. For despite their preoccupation 
with both matter and abstraction, the Russian Constructivists could 
be understood as having advocated for an emphasis neither on the 
‘matter’ nor on the underlying ‘idea’ of an artwork as concerns in and 
of themselves, but rather on capacities for praxis that might reorient 
relationships to matter in the world – a matter, in itself, of utmost 
material worth. The First Working Group of Constructivists, whose 
grand ambition was in ‘realising vital acts’,6 were conscious these 
were not to be mastered in the fields of design, engineering and 
construction alone, and those such as Boris Arvatov, who insisted on 
the primacy of material as a precedent for socially purposeful forms, 
held that command of material presupposed experimentation, 
‘laboratories’ of abstract thought – sites of engagement, above all 
else, in questions of potentiality. 
Can it be any loss, in that case, that Vladimir Tatlin’s proposal for the 
Monument to the Third International, all three (lost) incarnations being 
models, was never intended as something to be rendered ‘real’? 
While the technology to synthesise so dizzying a tower of iron and 
revolving glass was not remotely within reach of an agrarian 1920s 
Russia, the work implied an organisational relationship between 
people (with its communal conference centres and centralised hubs 
of propaganda), a relationship to politics of space (in its supposed 
situation at Communism’s Muscovite heart) a relationship to the 
physical world (tilted in perfect parallel with the axis of the Earth) 
and last, a relationship to the compromised conditions of possibility 
that worked against all these things. Models of such self-conscious 
limitation, in the words of Tatlin himself, ‘stimulate us to invention in 
our work of creating a new world, and […] call upon the producers 
to exercise control over the forms encountered in our everyday life’.7
Can it be any loss, furthermore, that the paintings Lyubov Popova 
called ‘space force constructions’ were ‘to be regarded only as a 
series of preparatory experiments’?8 Or that her contribution to 
the Third Communist International was also curtailed in the end? 
Having worked on the sets for a piece of military theatre, titled ‘The 
End of Capital’ and destined (at least provisionally) for Moscow’s 
busy streets, what, you could ask, was negated when ‘new controls 
on street activities’ called the whole thing off? Not the dream of 
capital’s end itself. Repeatedly suppressed with violent hands, 
Constructivism’s most profound afterlife didn’t always manifest in 
‘realisations’. When Lygia Pape developed Constructivist notions 
into new sociological and anthropological ideas and forms in ’50s 
and ’60s Brazil, most memorable were works, like the strange Divisor, 
that had many more lives than were actualised. First imagined, 
but never materialised, as a plastic awning for suspension in an 
exhibition space, hung so that gallery-goers might put their heads 
through its holes, the artist hoped to induce and critique with the 
work a kind of embodied alienation. Divisor’s first actual staging 
took place by a Rio favela in 1967. Neighbourhood children, without 
instruction from the artist, slid onto the sweeping expanse of cloth 
she had left for them on the ground and poked their heads through 
its holes. An impromptu performance of sorts was birthed as they 
chattered away to each other, walking as one sheet. Only after this 
did the artist ascribe specific parameters to the piece on its renewal 
in other contexts, and still its possibilities remained continually open. 
‘There is no work’, wrote Pape: ‘there is only the unfolding into a 
thousand routes’.9 
Perhaps it should come as no surprise, given the traditions of 
thought from which it emerged, that the Pozitron was considered 










in of its specified industrial site. Or was it that the museum (here the 
biennial setting) was simply understood as more or less a factory 
itself? A site, as Hito Steyerl most notably put it, of hyper-production 
(of images) and exhibition value; a space of confinement and 
disciplined gazes – a site of organised exploitation?10 Just as Celms 
tests out industry’s limited powers of wish-fulfilment by projecting 
his work into the factory, Steyerl posits the museum itself as a site 
of inherent unfulfillment. A site, that is, of an unfulfilled vision of 
transparent, ‘public’ discourse. With its overflow of durational films, 
blaring at once as nobody listens, woven into a sprawling texture 
of generalised unintelligibility, the museum, says Steyerl, puts on 
display its consistent absence of public discourse, making the 
presence of that absence as public as did Celms with his ‘models’ in 
their absence of power to be named as art. 
While the museum as represented by Steyerl can hardly be read 
as intentional or earnest in any reflexive display of unfulfillment, 
RIBOCA2’s re-conception explicitly moved the agenda towards 
this kind of reflexivity. The biennial’s landscape of empty lots and 
‘wastelands’, granaries, a paintball field and various hangars, all 
of which were earmarked as site-specific backdrops to a series 
of physical events, instead became the setting for a feature film 
(constituting the biennial’s ‘reimagining’) that unfolded interactions 
between finished, unfinished and absent works of art.11 In its 
purposeful attention to the question of lack – to that which intervenes 
both in art’s viability and its visibility, the RIBOCA2 film tends towards 
the engagement of a discourse lacking in the polished museum. As 
Celms wrote of his kinetic process, motion and structural conditions 
are not the only relevant factors in the genesis of form. An object’s 
character also depends on ‘the source of energy that generates this 
motion […], the potential uses this source allows and the way in which 
energy is managed’.12 So, indeed, does the management of artworks’ 
‘virtualisation’ thoroughly shape those artworks’ distribution and 
their meaning. Online museums might frequently be built as variously 
accessible repositories of virtual simulacra – not much more than 
thumbnails representing art ‘items’. But so might they be built to 
emphasise the Deleuzian ‘virtual’ lives of artworks that have not or 
couldn’t be made. The ‘virtual’ ground of a ‘real life’ work cannot, 
says Deleuze, resemble it. The ‘virtual’ is by definition differentiated in 
form from that which it might ground. RIBOCA2, always intended as 
a forum for examining ruptures of modern utopias and Soviet ideals 
while tending towards counter-hegemonic visions of ‘tomorrow’, 
staged its differential re-conception ‘somewhere between a ruin and 
a construction site’, in a liminal space that acknowledged both its 
own situation and ‘the limits of our control’.13 Rather than a stealth, 
begrudging reconstruction of the works in an awkward and falsely 
‘complete’ online space, the film was a means of drafting in the virtual 
to engage with the unrealised itself – the virtual as space of potential 
and therefore a ‘virtual’ space.
*
The virtual, of course, need not only be a site of utopian ‘virtuality’, 
as typified by a phenomenon in early net art that virtualised a vision 
from the past. In 1848 Fyodor Dostoevsky embarked on a novel 
which, according to one of his biographers, would have prefigured 
(Constructivist) concerns with the social value of art, between 
utilitarian ‘goals’ and Romantic fancies of autonomy, but the novel 
in which he would do so was cut off close to inception; Netochka 
Nezvanova, the story of a woman whose name translates as 
‘Nameless Nobody’, only made it as far as its own and its heroine’s 







































a literary circle whose aim was to unravel the wrongs of autocracy and 
serfdom with recourse to Western philosophy, the partial novel, not 
to be returned to, became its own testament to the limits of art and 
language as means of emancipation. If Dostoevsky meant to speak to 
the artist’s role in the possible, an online materialisation of Netochka 
Nezvanova, in the form of an artist presence identified by that name, 
would in 1995 become a hallmark for the power of the virtual sphere 
as a site of malevolent ‘virtualities’. Netochka Nezvanova, avatar 
of avant-garde internet performance, while picking up perversely 
on Dostoevsky’s vision of the artist as an aesthete with a purpose, 
became as known for her abstract and usable software artworks as 
she did for aggressive displays of anonymous cyber-domination. 
Until around 2002, Netochka Nezvanova put her (lack of a) name to 
various pieces of widely used software. Although numerous artists 
and programmers were likely responsible for her output, associated 
also with other aliases, including antiorp, inte.ger and m2zk!n3nkunzt, 
she managed to establish a reasonably coherent identity largely 
through two trademark strategies, one being widespread trolling, 
the other a knack for proprietary capitalisation. Underlying both was 
an interest in at once exploiting and exposing online information 
architectures. Liberal use of largely unintelligible code in relentless 
mailing-list spam was one basic means of drawing attention to 
interfaces’ internal layers; denial-of-service attacks on websites was 
another way of showcasing virtual power and vulnerability. Having 
given the world Nato.0+55_3d (1999), one of the first applications 
with real-time video manipulation capacities, enabling artists to 
reconstitute video as live performance, Netochka Nezvanova also 
showed the easy intersection of such internet ‘firsts’ with functions 
of monopoly capitalism. Distributing software licenses at whimsical 
but not insignificant fees, Nezvanova would revoke the access of any 
who criticised her code in public. Withdrawing licenses or denying 
already-paid-for software updates, her exercise of power in its fully 
realised form was a lesson in potentiality-not-to as violence. What’s 
more, it demonstrated the extent to which the virtual economy could 
be seen as a ‘virtual’ space of potential for capitalistic exchange 
minus the basics of accountability.
If Netochka Nezvanova’s internet practices floodlight the darker side 
of virtual art’s materiality – the tendency of such art, for all its utopian 
impulses, to proffer and develop dystopian potentialities too – this 
testifies, in part, to technology’s distance from its surface neutrality. 
As Nezvanova herself articulated her vision, the internet is formed on 
a ‘panoply of actions and interactions, mutualism, parasitism, mimicry 
and errors’, none of which suggest a neutral and few of which an 
equitable space.14 And inasmuch as we can understand the virtual to 
be a space of potentiality, with such virtual artworks as RIBOCA2’s 
revived Pozitron working to expose potentiality’s dynamics, Netochka 
Nezvanova pointed to the sense in which the virtual can serve as site 
of mystification as much as exposure. The characteristic opacity of 
the code in which she expressed herself, all the while exerting the 
kinds of tyranny that privileged access to information affords, reveals 
the truth of the virtual not as a site of dematerialisation, but rather 
as a site of materiality purposefully obscured. The virtual sphere’s 
tendency towards deliberate obfuscation – protecting the unequal 
distribution of knowledge and therefore possibility – is precisely 
the fault that motivates Hito Steyerl’s long-term interest in the ‘poor 
image’. The glitchy, scar-ridden digital file that qualifies as ‘poor’, by 
drawing attention to its own corrupted code, exposes, for Steyerl, 
the conditions of its own visibility – the violence that inheres in the 










in For Steyerl, any distinction between virtual and material realities 
is subject to the deepest suspicion. Still, in her art, the virtual is 
frequently privileged as a means of excavating Deleuze’s ‘virtual’ 
domain. Her 2015 video installation The Tower, for instance, merges 
CGI and film in a virtual environment from which to consider an 
unrealised architectural project, spearheaded by Saddam Hussein, 
that aimed to reconstruct the mythic tower of Babel. Centred on a 
particular virtual reality graphics company on Ukraine’s conflict-
riven border with Russia, the three video channels wind through the 
virtually continuous sites of the eponymous tower, a shooting game 
and a complex of luxury condos. ‘Realisation’ is broken down in 
the context of a world where a metastatic virtual realm is infinitely 
implicated in what is called the ‘real’. ‘Immaterial’ processes of real 
estate rendering, online gambling and military simulation, united in 
relation to this one VR programmer, arc into real-life military conflict 
and unarguable material dispossession. With The Tower Steyerl uses 
a virtual space to tether hypotheticals to that which they ground, 
sketching the digital construction of material truths, experiences 
entangled in ‘immaterial’ networks that outsource, offshore, exploit 
and destroy. The Tower is neither utopian in the manner of the Pozitron, 
nor a dystopian performance of cyber-tyranny. Rather, it advances a 
meta-exploration of how virtual art relates to ‘virtual’ ontology – how 
the realm of the hypothetical bears on the (mediated) real. 
While The Tower’s tower graphic is actually based on the Great 
Mosque of Samarra, the video’s reference to Babel as a fulcrum of 
unrealisation seems far from incidental. Some fifteen years before 
making The Tower, Steyerl had spoken of a Franz Kafka fragment 
from 1920 in which the writer proposed the idea of digging a pit 
of Babel, rather than the mythic tower. ‘Instead of constructing a 
monumental presence’, she noted, ‘he suggests the active creation 
of an absence, which has to be excavated in order to advance 
things and to be able to progress’.15 Since the disaster at Babel, 
according to its mythos, resulted in the loss of a universal language, 
the implication seems to be that the creation of such a language 
would require the construction of knowledge ‘bottom up’. For 
while technological means of mass communication might parade 
pretensions to universality, at least from the aerial perspective 
signified by a tower, they have in fact concealed those tensions and 
exclusions that imperfectly ‘universal’ codes so typically inscribe, 
and that only a perspective from the ground would ever be able 
to reveal. Take, for instance, the development of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz’s universal code at the end of the seventeenth century. As 
Steyerl points out, his proof of universality leant on a false equation of 
zeros and ones with (respectively) the interrupted and uninterrupted 
lines of Chinese hexagrams as found in the I Ching – an imposition of 
correspondence rather than an accurate discovery in dialogue with 
more first-hand channels of understanding. Netochka Nezvanova 
reveals something similar in her treatment of digital code, as several 
of her works showcase the strange and entrancing audiovisual 
results of translating code from one form into another – code into 
sound, sound into graphics, graphics into code. That which you’d 
expect to correspond to something legible often proves harder to 
fathom, and if The Tower attempts to unearth potentialities – plans 
for building and destruction – that are otherwise sheathed in virtual 
networks of communication, that which it posits as most unfulfilled is 
the dream of Babel itself.
As I write, The Tower can be seen online, via an independent ‘gallery 
guide’, as part of a ‘VR’ 360° tour of the exhibition ‘Life Captured 







































of access while the gallery itself is closed. Arrows joltily drag the 
viewer between installations that, given the limitations of this virtual 
format, are often moments in these videos literally captured still. 
The purpose of this virtual exhibition in the absence of access to 
the moving image is somewhat unclear. Pre-dating the gallery’s 
unforeseen closure (which lends the virtual version a kind of ‘virtuality’ 
as a shadowy parallel of the exhibition’s unrealised run) the virtual 
tour is predominantly a deadened record of a once-living show. The 
virtual here intrudes on the work in the interest of little more than 
its capture as so many units of cultural value, its replacement as so 
many objects in the kind of contemporary ‘museum’ that Steyerl 
aligned with the factory – a container for the production for ‘images, 
jargon, lifestyle and values’.
And yet, if conditions are such that a factory becomes a museum, a 
museum the set for a biennial-reimagined-as-film, there have arisen 
artistic inventions that give reason to expect or insist that the film 
sets of this time might be more than cemeteries of cultural widgets. 
If the virtualisation of art on the one hand opens onto instances of 
art’s inertia – works entering awkwardly into an order of vacuous 
commodities while heightening a pretence to immateriality that 
mystifies that order, the consequence need not be a return to 
nostalgic veneration of the physical object – the object that is honest, 
at least, in its relationship to the market. There is scope, it would 
seem, for virtual art to expose, critique and intervene in the politics 
of what is materially possible. Such feats of artistic intervention 
demand an openness and sensitivity to questions of ‘virtuality’ – that 
which Deleuze imagined to have greater material significance than 
what is understood to be ‘real’, realised, complete. Contra prevailing 
tendencies in online representation, the virtual can be recruited as a 
means of manifesting the ‘virtual’ capacities and limits of artworks that 
have not been, could not be or will not ever be ‘actualised’. Pointing 
to their own contingency, proposing perhaps utopias, perhaps the 
violence inherent in non-creation, these artworks attest to what has 
been revealed about incompatible realities – realities that belong, at 
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Valdis Celms, Pozitron, 1976, 
kinetic maquette of steel, 
paper and wood, 46 x 37 x 40cm. 
Collection Zimmerli Art Museum at 
Rutgers University, Norton and Nancy 
Dodge Collection of Nonconformist 


















































Lyubov Popova, Space Force 
Construction, 1921–22, paper, 
gouache, graphite pencil, 47.9 x 41cm. 





















Hito Steyerl, The Tower, 3 channel video 
installation, 2015 HD video, colour, sound, 
6min 55sec. Installation view, Esther 
Schipper, Berlin, 2019. Photograph © Andrea 
Rossetti. © VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, 2020.  
Courtesy the artist, Andrew Kreps Gallery, 







































Netochka Nezvanova,  
m9ndfukc.0+99, 1999.  











































































Lygia Pape, Divisor, 1967, performance 
at MAM, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.  
Courtesy Projeto Lygia Pape
